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Article
Myths can be defined as commonly held, false beliefs about 
real persons or events, which are held contrary to known evi-
dence (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007). Common science-related 
myths include the misconception that human beings only use 
10% of their brains and that the Great Wall of China is the 
only human-made object visible from the moon (Swami, 
Stieger, Pietschnig, Nader, & Voracek, 2012). Such myths 
have sometimes been referred to as “naïve science,” because 
it is thought that individuals acquire such beliefs in a primi-
tive, trial-and-error fashion (Pine, Messer, & St. John, 2001) 
and because they carry some significance that motivates their 
preservation and propagation (Brunvand, 2002).
Understanding science-related myths remains an impor-
tant task for a number of reasons. First, it is known that, once 
a myth is accepted, new information is frequently distorted 
or ignored (Dole, 2000), and the incorrect belief is strength-
ened and becomes difficult to dislodge (Vosniadu, 2001). In 
addition, acceptance of science-related myths has a detri-
mental effect on scientific literacy, which in turn may have a 
negative impact on academic achievement, economic pro-
ductivity, and participation in civic affairs (Hazen & Trefl, 
2009). In some cases, myths—including myths derived from 
within social science (Ferguson, 2013)—may also be at the 
center of moral panics and unnecessary fears in society 
(Radford, 1999) or result in harmful or wasteful effects (e.g., 
seeking out ineffective medical or psychological treatments; 
Lilienfeld, Lynn, Ruscio, & Beyerstein, 2010). Conversely, 
better understanding of myths as well as attitudes toward sci-
ence may help practitioners promote acquisition of more 
accurate knowledge (Sturgis & Allum, 2004).
To date, however, much of the literature on science-
related myths has focused on belief in myths of psychology, 
or what Lilienfeld et al. (2010) termed “psychomythology.” 
Thus, studies have reported that members of the general pub-
lic have difficulty distinguishing between factual and fic-
tional claims about human behavior (e.g., Bensley, Lilienfeld, 
& Powell, 2014; Della Sala, 1999, 2007; Furnham, Callahan, 
& Rawles, 2003; Gardner & Brown, 2013; Herculano-
Houzel, 2002). Related work has indicated that even students 
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Abstract
This study examined individual difference correlates of belief in a narrative about the discovery of giant skeletal remains that 
contravenes mainstream scientific explanations. A total of 364 participants from Central Europe completed a survey that 
asked them to rate their agreement with a short excerpt describing the giant skeleton myth. Participants also completed 
measures of the Big Five personality factors, New Age orientation, anti-scientific attitudes, superstitious beliefs, and religiosity. 
Results showed that women, as compared with men, and respondents with lower educational qualifications were significantly 
more likely to believe in the giant skeleton myth, although effect sizes were small. Correlational analysis showed that 
stronger belief in the giant skeleton myth was significantly associated with greater anti-scientific attitudes, stronger New Age 
orientation, greater religiosity, stronger superstitious beliefs, lower Openness to Experience scores, and higher Neuroticism 
scores. However, a multiple regression showed that the only significant predictors of belief in myth were Openness, New 
Age orientation, and anti-scientific attitudes. These results are discussed in relation to the potential negative consequences 
of belief in myths.
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of psychology subscribe to many myths of psychology or do 
not accurately understand psychology as a science (e.g., 
Standing & Huber, 2003; Swami et al., 2015; Taylor & 
Kowalski, 2004; Thompson & Zamboanga, 2004).
By contrast, one recent study sought to develop a psycho-
metric measure of belief in a broader range of science-related 
myths (Swami et al., 2012). More specifically, the authors 
developed the 20-item Belief in Science-Related Myths 
Scale (BiSMyS) consisting of popular science-related narra-
tives, which they reported could be reduced to two moder-
ately correlated factors (r = .46) concerning human-related 
(e.g., “The average woman swallows six pounds of lipstick 
during her lifetime”) and non-human-related myths (e.g., 
“Storing batteries in a refrigerator or freezer will improve 
their performance”). In addition, Swami and colleagues 
(2012) reported that human-related, but not non-human-
related myths, were significantly associated with anti-scien-
tific attitudes, New Age orientation, and the Big Five 
personality factor of Extraversion.
Although the BiSMyS is a useful addition to the armory 
of researchers wishing to examine belief in science-related 
myths, an alternative method of approaching the same topic 
is to focus on belief in specific myths. For example, in 2004, 
digitally altered photographs purporting to depict “giant 
skeletons” were paired with a fictitious narrative based on 
the Islamic account of the people of Aad. In 2007, the hoax 
was repeated and widely disseminated through social net-
working sites and email forwards, with the locale changed 
from Saudi Arabia in the original to northern India in the new 
version (Mikkelson & Mikkelson, 2010). Although a myth 
(the origin of accompanying photographs have been traced to 
an entry to create an archaeological hoax1), the narrative was 
widely disseminated, including by reputable news agencies 
in South Asia (see Owen, 2007).
The giant skeleton myth offers a useful means of examin-
ing belief in myths for two reasons. First, the fuller narrative 
of the myth and the use of accompanying imagery allow 
scholars to examine belief in the myth in a similar fashion to 
its original transmission. That is, by utilizing the myth as it 
was originally transmitted, it should be possible to focus on 
belief in a myth that retains most, if not all, of its transmis-
sion mechanism (see Fernback, 2003; Kibby, 2005). Second, 
by focusing on a specific myth, it is possible to examine indi-
vidual difference correlates of belief in the myth specifically, 
rather than science-related myths in general.
In this study, then, we focused on belief in a giant skeleton 
myth that was presented to participants in a similar manner 
to its original transmission. Specifically, participants were 
presented with information about the purported discovery of 
the skeletal remains of a giant along with an accompanying 
(doctored) image, and were asked to rate their belief in the 
claim. In addition, we examined associations between belief 
in this particular myth and measures of the Big Five person-
ality factors, anti-scientific attitudes, and New Age orienta-
tion. Based on previous work (Swami et al., 2012), we 
expected that belief in the giant skeleton myth would be 
positively associated with anti-scientific attitudes, New Age 
orientation, and possibly the Big Five traits of Openness to 
Experience and Extraversion. In addition, participants also 
completed a measure of superstitious belief and, given the 
myth’s religious connotations, a measure of religiosity.
Method
Participants
Participants were 364 German-speaking individuals (194 
women, 170 men) from Central Europe (Austria = 80.7%, 
German = 17.1%, other = 2.2%). Participants ranged in age 
from 18 to 85 years (M = 32.09, SD = 13.53). The vast major-
ity of participants were of European Caucasian descent 
(98.9%) and, in terms of marital status, 33.4% were single, 
38.1% were cohabiting with a romantic partner, 21.8% were 
married, 2.8% were divorced or separated, 2.2% were wid-
owed, and 1.7% were of some other marital status. In terms 
of educational qualifications, 4.5% had completed minimum 
compulsory schooling, 68.4% had completed secondary edu-
cation, 7.1% had an undergraduate degree, and 19.5% had a 
postgraduate degree.
Measures
Belief in the giant skeleton myth. Participants were presented 
with an excerpt that purportedly reported on the discovery of 
the skeletal remains of a giant skeleton (see the appendix). 
The excerpt was adapted from a blog entry that was circu-
lated via email (and attributed to an April 2004 Times of 
India article), with the locale set in northern India (for details, 
see www.snopes.com/photos/odd/giantman.asp). Accompa-
nying the excerpt was an image purportedly depicting the 
remains of a giant, which had been circulated along with the 
original email. Once participants had read the excerpt and 
viewed the image, they were asked to rate their agreement 
with four statements, namely “This article presents good evi-
dence for the existence of giants,” “I am convinced that 
giants once existed on Earth,” “I believe this article is a 
hoax,” and “The arguments of this article are convincing.” 
Each of these items were rated on a 6-point Likert-type scale 
(1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree) and the third item 
was reverse-coded prior to analyses for consistency. The fac-
tor structure of this measure is evaluated in the “Results” 
section.
Big Five personality dimensions. Participants completed the 
NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI; Costa & McCrae, 
1989; German translation: Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1993), 
which assesses each of the dimensions of Neuroticism, Extra-
version, Openness to Experience, Agreeableness, and Consci-
entiousness with 12 items each (sample item, “I often feel 
tense and jittery”). These dimensions reflect an individual’s 
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personality at the broadest level (i.e., through the inclusion of 
a maximum spectrum of different traits) and with efficiency 
(i.e., with a minimum set of dimensions). All items were rated 
on a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = 
strongly agree) and dimension scores were computed as the 
mean of items associated with each subscale. The parent 
NEO-FFI and its translations have been shown to have very 
good patterns of reliability and validity (Costa & McCrae, 
1989). In the present study, Cronbach’s α for the subscales 
were Neuroticism, .87; Extraversion, .79; Openness, .77; 
Agreeableness, .75; and Conscientiousness, .85.
Anti-scientific attitudes. To measure anti-scientific attitudes, 
we used the Anti-Scientific subscale of the New Age Beliefs 
Scale (Yates & Chandler, 2000; German translation: Swami 
et al., 2012; sample item: “The primary purpose of scientific 
language is to confuse the average person”). This is an 8-item 
measure of negative attitudes toward contemporary science, 
in which items are rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale (−3 = 
totally unbelievable, +3 = totally believable). For the present 
purposes, scores were recomputed prior to analysis (1 = 
totally unbelievable, 7 = totally believable) and an overall 
score was computed as the mean of all items (higher scores 
reflect greater anti-scientific attitudes). Previous work has 
reported that this subscale has a one-dimensional factor 
structure with good internal consistency (Yates & Chandler, 
2000). Cronbach’s α for this scale in the present study was 
.73.
New Age orientation. Participants completed the 22-item New 
Age Orientation Scale (NAOS; Granqvist & Hagekull, 2001; 
German translation: Swami et al., 2012; sample item: “The 
position of the stars at birth affects how one will live one’s 
life or how one’s personality will develop”). This scale mea-
sures individual differences in broad and specific systems of 
thought, beliefs, interests, and activities that can be described 
as New Age. Items were rated on a 6-point Likert-type scale 
(1 =strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree) and an overall 
New Age orientation score was computed by taking the mean 
of all items (higher scores reflect greater New Age orienta-
tion). The NAOS has been shown to have good patterns of 
validity and reliability. In the present study, the scale’s inter-
nal consistency was .94.
Superstitious beliefs. Superstitious beliefs were measured 
using the six-item Lucky Charms Scale developed by Wise-
man and Watt (2004; German translation: Voracek, 2009; 
sample item: “Have you avoided walking under a ladder 
because it is associated with bad luck?”). The scale measures 
agreement with both negative (e.g., walking under a ladder) 
and positive (e.g., touching wood) superstitions (1 = totally 
disagree, 6 = totally agree). Although it is possible to calcu-
late separate scores for positive and negative superstitious 
beliefs, Voracek (2009) showed that the German version of 
this scale was best considered as one dimensional. Therefore, 
an overall score was computed as the mean of all six items, 
with higher scores reflecting stronger superstitious beliefs. 
Cronbach’s α for this scale in the present study was .85, 
which is similar to that reported for previous uses of the Ger-
man translation of the scale (Swami et al., 2011; Voracek, 
2009).
Religiosity. Participants’ religiosity was measured using a 
single-item measure of intrinsic religiosity (1 = not at all 
religious, 7 = very religious). Although the use of a single 
item is limited in terms of breadth, single-item measures of 
religiosity have been shown to have good reliability and 
validity among community samples (e.g., Abdel-Khalek, 
2007).
Demographics. Participants provided their demographic 
details consisting of sex, age, nationality, ethnicity, marital 
status, and highest educational qualification.
Procedure
All participants were recruited opportunistically; that is, 
eight researchers directly recruited participants from among 
their personal contacts. Participants were given brief infor-
mation about the project, provided informed consent, and 
completed an anonymous paper-and-pencil version survey. 
Order of appearance of the scales was fixed (belief in the 
giant skeleton myth, NEO-FFI, NAOS, Anti-Scientific sub-
scale, Lucky Charms Scale, demographics, religiosity). All 




To examine the factor structure of the four-item measure of 
belief in the giant skeleton myth, we computed a principal-
axis exploratory factor analysis using quartimax rotation, 
because of the expectation of the emergence of a general fac-
tor (Pedhazur & Schmelkin, 1991). Bartlett’s test of spheric-
ity, χ2(6) = 482.00, p < .001, and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
(KMO) measure of sampling adequacy, KMO = .86, showed 
that the items of this scale had adequate common variance 
for factor analysis. Both, the EGV1 criterion (eigenvalues 
with a value > 1.0) and examination of the scree-plot, sug-
gested the extraction of a single factor, which accounted for 
63.1% of the variance (λ = 2.55). All four items loaded onto 
this factor with loadings in the range of .74 to .84. Based on 
these results, we computed an overall score of belief in the 
giant skeleton myth as the mean of all four items, with higher 
scores indicating greater belief that the article was truthful. 
Cronbach’s α for this measure was .79.
Stronger agreement with the giant skeleton myth was 
shown by women (M = 2.36, SD = 1.11) compared with men 
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(M = 2.04, SD = 1.06). An independent t test showed that the 
difference between women and men was significant, t(362) = 
2.77, p = .006, d = 0.29. However, univariate ANOVAs 
showed that whereas there were no significant between-
group differences as a function of nationality, F(2, 360) = 
1.53, p = .218, η
p
2 < .01, there were some small between-
group differences as a function of education, F(3, 360) = 
3.62, p = .013, η
p
2 = .03. Participants who had completed 
only minimum compulsory schooling (M = 2.88, SD = 1.24) 
agreed more strongly with the giant skeleton myth than par-
ticipants with upper secondary education (M = 2.21, SD = 
1.09) or a postgraduate degree (M = 1.98, SD = 0.95; Tukey 
Honest Significant Difference post hoc tests, ps < .05; par-
ticipants with undergraduate degree: M = 2.41, SD = 1.29).
Inter-Scale Correlations and Multiple Regression
Descriptive statistics (M and SD) and inter-scale correlations 
for all variables included in the study are reported in Table 1. 
As can be seen, stronger belief in the giant skeleton myth 
was significantly associated with greater anti-scientific atti-
tudes, stronger New Age orientation, greater religiosity, 
stronger superstitious beliefs, lower Openness to Experience 
scores, and higher Neuroticism scores. We next conducted a 
multiple linear regression with belief in the giant skeleton 
myth as the criterion variable and the Big Five traits, anti-
scientific attitudes, New Age orientation, superstitious 
beliefs, and religiosity as predictors. Results showed that the 
regression model was significant, F(9, 350) = 9.82, p < .001, 
adj. R2 = .20. Multicollinearity was not a limiting factor in 
this regression (all variance inflation factors <2.36). 
Regression coefficients are reported in Table 2 and, as can be 
seen, the only significant predictors of belief in the giant 
skeleton myth were Openness to Experience, New Age ori-
entation, and anti-scientific attitudes.
Discussion
Our results showed, first, a significant and negative relation-
ship between belief in the giant skeleton myth and Openness 
to Experience. It is likely that this association is based on the 
fact that Openness correlates with intelligence and intellec-
tual curiosity. For example, studies have indicated that 
Openness is moderately correlated with crystallized and 
fluid intelligence (e.g., Moutafi, Furnham, & Crump, 2006). 
Improved cognitive abilities, in turn, may mean that indi-
viduals are more intellectually suspicious, particularly when 
presented with information that is diffuse and of unknown 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for, and Inter-Scale Correlations Between, All Measures Included in the Present Study.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
 (1)   Belief in giant skeleton myth .12* −.05 −.21** −.01 .01 .38** .34** .21** .24**
 (2)  Neuroticism −.42** .01 −.16* −.38** .13* .19** .19** −.02
 (3)  Extraversion .17* .35** .24** −.01 .01 .07 .07
 (4)  Openness .11* .16* −.20** .09 −.10 −.14*
 (5)  Agreeableness .09 .12* .13* .01 .16*
 (6)  Conscientiousness .01 −.04 −.07 .14*
 (7)   Anti-scientific attitudes .63** .25** .46**
 (8)  New Age orientation .33** .34**
 (9)  Superstitious beliefs .10
(10)  Religiosity  
M 2.21 2.77 3.32 3.64 3.59 3.63 2.93 2.68 2.08 2.83
SD 1.10 0.71 0.55 0.57 0.51 0.61 0.98 1.04 1.15 1.75
Note. N = 364.
*p < .05. **p < .001.
Table 2. The Unstandardized and Standardized Regression Coefficients for the Variables Entered Into the Regression Model.
Variable B SE β t p
Neuroticism .09 .09 .06 1.05 .296
Extraversion .04 .11 .02 0.33 .742
Openness to experience −.34 .10 −.18 −3.38 .001
Agreeableness −.08 .11 −.04 −0.73 .465
Conscientiousness −.02 .10 −.01 −0.21 .834
Anti-scientific attitudes .19 .08 .17 2.46 .014
New Age orientation .23 .07 .21 3.26 .001
Superstitious beliefs .01 .01 .03 0.46 .645
Religiosity .04 .05 .06 0.76 .446
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veracity. Consistent with this perspective, it has also been 
shown that Openness is positively associated with need for 
cognition (Fleischhauer et al., 2010), that is, a personality 
construct referring to an individual’s tendency to scrutinize 
information and to think deeply about ideas and concepts. 
More broadly, this perspective may also help to explain why 
individuals with lower educational qualifications more 
strongly endorsed the giant skeleton myth than those with 
higher qualifications, although it should be noted that the 
effect size of this difference was small.
Our results also showed that greater belief in the giant 
skeleton myth was associated with stronger New Age orien-
tation. It has been suggested that New Age beliefs may rep-
resent a secularized religion that incorporates a blend of 
ingredients (Granqvist & Hagekull, 2001; Houtman & 
Aupers, 2007), including systems of thought (e.g., astrology, 
Eastern philosophies) and specific beliefs (e.g., in parapsy-
chological phenomena). Indeed, two particularly notable 
aspects of New Age orientation are its religious syncretism 
and epistemological subjectivism (Hanegraaff, 2002). These 
characteristics may make the myth of the giant skeleton a 
particularly appealing one to individuals with a strong New 
Age orientation. In addition, the New Age approach to truth 
is often opposed to the analytic methods of science (Flere & 
Kirbiš, 2009), which may enhance belief in the giant skele-
ton myth either directly or through the association between 
New Age orientation and anti-scientific attitudes (in our 
study, r = .63).
This suggestion links with our third key finding, namely, 
the relationship between belief in the giant skeleton myth 
and anti-scientific attitudes. The latter refers to an aversion to 
the analytic methods of mainstream science, particularly 
rules of evidence generation and evaluation (Yates & 
Chandler, 2000). This may make individuals who are hold-
ing stronger anti-scientific attitudes less willing or able to 
critically evaluate claims of a dubious nature, such as the 
giant skeleton narrative. Although anti-scientific attitudes 
was the weakest of our significant predictors in our regres-
sion, this relationship is consistent with the earlier finding 
that anti-scientific attitudes are correlated with belief in sci-
ence-related myths (Swami et al., 2012). More broadly, it 
might be suggested that holding anti-scientific attitudes 
makes the assimilation of anomalous beliefs, such as the 
giant skeleton myth, more likely.
A number of additional findings of the present work are 
worthy of mention. First, we found that religiosity emerged 
as a significant correlate of belief in the giant skeleton myth 
(indeed, it was one of the stronger correlates), but did not 
emerge as a significant predictor in our multiple regression. 
If New Age beliefs do indeed represent a secularized religion 
(Granqvist & Hagekull, 2001), then it is likely that there is a 
good deal of shared variance accounted for by New Age ori-
entation and religiosity. Likewise, there is likely a good deal 
of overlap between New Age beliefs and superstitious 
beliefs, which may explain why the latter emerged as a 
significant correlate of belief in the giant skeleton myth but 
not as a significant predictor.
In addition, our results suggest that belief in the giant 
skeleton myth may have a number of unique personality pre-
dictors compared with belief in science-related myths more 
broadly. Specifically, science-related myths appear to be 
associated with the Big Five personality factor of Extraversion 
(Swami et al., 2012). However, Extraversion did not emerge 
as a significant correlate of belief in the giant skeleton myth, 
possibly suggesting a distinction between meta-theoretical 
beliefs about science-related myths and specific myths. We 
also found that women were significantly more likely to 
believe in the giant skeleton myth than men. This finding 
stands in contrast to the lack of gender differences in belief 
in science-related myths (Swami et al., 2012), although it 
should be noted that the effect size of the difference in the 
present study was small.
There are a number of ways in which the design of the 
present study could be improved upon. First, our sampling 
method may have introduced an inherent bias and our find-
ings should only be generalized to the wider population with 
caution; utilizing a more representative sample would offer 
one means of improving on the present work. Second, 
whereas we have focused on individual difference correlates 
of belief in a specific myth, future research may wish to 
incorporate a different theoretical perspective, such as the 
dual-process persuasive model (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1996). Such a perspective may be particu-
larly useful in understanding the assimilation of myths, inso-
far as it focuses attention on variables associated with the 
source and message, which the present study did not 
manipulate.
The findings of the present study suggest that there are a 
number of individual difference correlates of belief in a spe-
cific myth that contravenes conventional scientific explana-
tion. Although our study was limited to a specific myth, it 
should be noted that most such myths have a specific format 
and are typically in continuous circulation (Sacco, 2005), 
thus allowing for some generalization of findings. Moreover, 
such myths can sometimes emerge from within social sci-
ence itself (Ferguson, 2013). If our research can be corrobo-
rated (e.g., with a further set of myths or using a naturalistic 
design), our findings will prove useful for policy makers 
seeking to inoculate individuals from erroneous narratives, 
which may bring a raft of negative consequences with them 
(e.g., Ferguson, 2015; Hazen & Trefl, 2009; Lilienfeld et al., 
2010).
Appendix
The Excerpt of the Giant Skeleton Myth 
Presented to Participants
Recent exploration activity in the northern region of India has 
uncovered the skeletal remains of a human of phenomenal 
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size. This region of the Indian desert is called the Empty 
Quarter. The discovery was made by the Indian Division of 
the National Geographic Team, with support from the Indian 
Army as the area comes under the jurisdiction of the Army. 
The exploration team also found tablets that suggest the giant 
belonged to a race of superhumans that are mentioned in the 
Mahabharata, a Hindu epic poem from about 200 BC. The 
government of India has now secured the whole area and no 
one is allowed to enter except National Geographic 
personnel.
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Note
1. The claim must be a hoax because humanoid giants break the 
square-cube law, that is, the law that as a shape grows in size, 
its volume grows faster than its area. This law places funda-
mental limits to the size that humans can grow.
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